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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in adversarial Deep Learning (DL) have opened
up a largely unexplored surface for malicious attacks jeopardizing
the integrity of autonomous DL systems. With the wide-spread
usage of DL in critical and time-sensitive applications, including
unmanned vehicles, drones, and video surveillance systems, online
detection of malicious inputs is of utmost importance. We pro-
pose DeepFense, the first end-to-end automated framework that
simultaneously enables efficient and safe execution of DL models.
DeepFense formalizes the goal of thwarting adversarial attacks as
an optimization problem that minimizes the rarely observed re-
gions in the latent feature space spanned by a DL network. To solve
the aforementioned minimization problem, a set of complementary
but disjoint modular redundancies are trained to validate the legit-
imacy of the input samples in parallel with the victim DL model.
DeepFense leverages hardware/software/algorithm co-design and
customized acceleration to achieve just-in-time performance in
resource-constrained settings. The proposed countermeasure is un-
supervised, meaning that no adversarial sample is leveraged to train
modular redundancies. We further provide an accompanying API
to reduce the non-recurring engineering cost and ensure automated
adaptation to various platforms. Extensive evaluations on FPGAs
and GPUs demonstrate up to two orders of magnitude performance
improvement while enabling online adversarial sample detection.
KEYWORDS
Adversarial Attacks, Deep Learning, Model Reliability, FPGA Ac-
celeration, Real-time Computing
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have enabled a transformative shift
in various scientific fields ranging from natural language process-
ing and computer vision to health-care and intelligent transporta-
tion [1–3]. Although DNNs demonstrate superb accuracy in con-
trolled settings, it has been shown that they are particularly vul-
nerable to adversarial samples: carefully crafted input instances
which lead machine learning algorithms into misclassifying while
the input changes are imperceptible to a naked eye.
In response to the various adversarial attack methodologies pro-
posed in the literature (e.g., [4–7]), several research attempts have
been made to design DL strategies that are more robust in the face
of adversarial examples. The existing countermeasures, however,
encounter (at least) two sets of limitations: (i) Although the prior-art
methods have reported promising results in addressing adversarial
attacks in black-box settings [8–10], their performance has been
shown to significantly drop in white-box scenarios where the ad-
versary has the full knowledge of the defense mechanism [11]. (ii)
None of the prior works have provided an automated hardware-
accelerated system for online defense against adversarial inputs.
Due to the wide-scale adoption of DL in sensitive autonomous
scenarios, it is crucial to equip all such models with a defense mech-
anism against the aforementioned adversaries.
We propose DeepFense, the first end-to-end hardware-
accelerated framework that enables robust and just-in-time defense
against adversarial attacks on DL models. Our key observation is
that the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial samples originates
from the existence of rarely-explored sub-spaces spanned by the
activation maps in each (hidden) layer. This phenomenon is partic-
ularly caused by (i) the high dimensionality of activation maps and
(ii) the limited amount of labeled data to fully traverse/learn the
underlying space. To characterize and thwart potential adversarial
sub-spaces, we propose a newmethod calledModular Robust Redun-
dancy (MRR). MRR is robust against the state-of-the-art adaptive
white-box attacks in which the adversary knows everything about
the victim model and its defenders.
Each modular redundancy characterizes the explored subspace
in a given layer by learning the Probability Density Function (PDF)
of typical data points and marking the complement regions as
rarely-explored/risky. Once such characterization is obtained, the
checkpointing modules evaluate the input sample in parallel with
the victim model and raise alarm flags for data points that lie within
the risky regions. The MRRs are trained in unsupervised settings
meaning that the training dataset is merely composed of typical
benign samples. This, in turn, ensures resiliency against potential
new attacks. Our unsupervised countermeasure impacts neither
the training complexity nor the final accuracy of the victim DNN.
DeepFense is devised based on a hardware/software/algorithm
co-design approach to enable safe DL while customizing system
performance in terms of latency, energy consumption, and/or mem-
ory footprint with respect to the underlying resource provisioning.
There is a trade-off between system performance and robustness
against adversarial attacks that is determined by the number of
modular redundancies. DeepFense provides an automated tool to
adaptively maximize the robustness of the defense model while
adhering to the user-defined and/or hardware-specific constraints.
We chose FPGAs to provide fine-grained parallelism and just-in-
time response by our defender modules. The customized data path
for memory access and network schemes on FPGA, in turn, helps
to improve the overall system energy efficiency.
Although several hardware-accelerated tools for DL execution
have been proposed in the literature, e.g. [12–16], none of them
have been particularly optimized for in-time defense against ad-
versarial inputs. For instance, defenders require a custom layer to
characterize and compare each incoming data sample against the
PDF of legitimate data. These types of custom layers are atypical
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Figure 1: Global flow of the DeepFense framework. DeepFense takes as input the high-level description of a DL model together with the pro-
posed defender topologies. Based on the user-provided constraints, DeepFense outputs the best defense layout to ensuremaximum throughput
and power efficiency, customized for the resource-constrained target hardware platform.
to conventional DNNs and have not been addressed in prior works.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Proposing DeepFense, the first hardware/software/algorithm
co-design that empowers online defense against adversarial
samples for DNNs. DeepFense methodology is unsupervised
and robust against the most challenging attack scenario in
real-world applications (white-box attacks).
• Devising an automated customization tool to adaptively max-
imize DL robustness against adversarial samples while com-
plying with the underlying hardware resource constraints
in terms of run-time, energy, and memory footprint.
• Providing the first implementation of custom streaming-
based DL defense using FPGAs. DeepFense leverages dictio-
nary learning and probability density functions to statisti-
cally detect abnormalities in the inputted data samples.
• Performing extensive proof-of-concept evaluations on com-
mon DL benchmarks against the state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks reported to-date. Thorough performance comparison
on various hardware platforms including embedded CPUs,
GPUs, and FPGAs corroborates DeepFense’s efficiency.
2 DeepFense GLOBAL FLOW
Figure 1 illustrates the global flow of DeepFense framework. We
consider a system consisting of a single classifier (a.k.a., victim
model) and a set of defender modules aiming to detect adversarial
samples. DeepFense consists of two main phases to characterize
and thwart adversarial attacks: (i) offline pre-processing phase to
train defender modules, and (ii) online execution phase in which
the legitimacy of each incoming input data is validated on the fly.
The one-time pre-processing phase is performed in software while
the recurrent execution phase is accelerated using FPGA.
Pre-processing phase. This phase consists of two tasks.
1 Resource Profiling and Design Customization. There is a
trade-off between execution run-time and system reliability in terms
of successful adversarial detection rate. DeepFense uses physical
profiling to estimate resource utilization for the victim model as
well as the defender modules. The output of physical profiling along
with a set of user-defined constraints (e.g., real-time requirements)
is then fed into the design customization unit to determine the
viable number of defenders and their appropriate locations based on
the sensitivity of DNN layers (Section 4.3). The customization unit
analyzes the trade-off between model reliability, resource limitation,
and throughput to decide the best combination of defenders suitable
to the task and customized for the target hardware.
2 Training Modular Redundancies. DeepFense trains a set of
redundancy modules (checkpoints) to isolate potential adversarial
sub-spaces. The redundancy modules can be categorized into two
classes, namely the Input Defenders (Section 3.3) and the Latent
(Intermediate) Defenders (Section 3.2). Each defender targets a par-
ticular layer in the victim model and is trained with the goal of
separating data manifolds and characterizing the underlying PDF
by careful realignment of legitimate data within each class.
Execution phase. Once the redundancy modules are trained
and customized per hardware and/or user-defined physical con-
straints, the underlying DL model is ready to be deployed for online
execution. DeepFense performs three tasks for the execution phase.
1 Forward Propagation. The predicted class for each incoming
sample is acquired through forward propagation in the victim DNN.
The predicted output is then fed to the defenders for validation.
2 Validation. DeepFense leverages the checkpoints learned in
the pre-processing phase to validate the legitimacy of the input
data and the associated label determined in the forward propaga-
tion step. In particular, samples that do not lie in the user-defined
probability interval which we refer to as the Security Parameter (SP)
are discarded as suspicious samples. SP is a constant number in the
range of [0 − 100] which determines the hardness of adversarial
detectors. For applications with excessive security requirements, a
high SP value assures full detection of adversarial samples.
3 Model Fusion. The outputs of the redundancy modules are
finally aggregated to compute the legitimacy probability of the
input data and its associated inference label (Section 3.4).
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Table 1: Motivational example: We compare the MRR methodology against prior-art works including Magnet [8], Efficient
Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks [9], and APE-GAN [10] in the white-box setting. For each evaluation, the adversarial
perturbation (L2 distortion) is normalized to that of the attack without the presence of any defense mechanism.
MRR Methodology Prior-Art Defenses
Security Parameter SP=1% SP=5% Magnet Efficient Defenses APE-GAN
Number of Defenders N=0 N=1 N=2 N=4 N=8 N=16 N=0 N=1 N=2 N=4 N=8 N=16 N=16 - -
Defense Success - 43% 53% 64% 65% 66% - 46% 63% 69% 81% 84% 1% 0% 0%
Normalized Distortion (L2) 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.12 1.31 1.38 1.00 1.09 1.28 1.28 1.63 1.57 1.37 1.30 1.06
FP Rate - 2.9% 4.4% 6.1% 7.8% 8.4% - 6.9% 11.2% 16.2% 21.9% 27.6% - - -
AttackModel.We consider the adaptive white-box threat model as
the most powerful attacker that can appear in real-world DL appli-
cations. In this scenario, we assume the attacker knows everything
about the victim model including the learning algorithm, model
topology, and parameters. With the presence of DeepFense parallel
defenders, the adversary is required to mislead all defenders to
succeed in forging an adversarial sample as a legitimate input.
3 DeepFense METHODOLOGY
DeepFense trains a number of modular redundancies to characterize
the data density distribution in the space spanned by the victim
model. In this section, we first provide a motivational example
for MRR methodology. We then elaborate on the MRR modules
that checkpoint the intermediate DL layers (latent defenders) and
input space (input defenders). Lastly, we discuss the model fusion
to aggregate the MRR outputs and derive the final decision.
3.1 Motivational Example
The rationale behind our MRR methodology is not only to thwart
adversarial attacks in black-box settings (where the adversary is
not aware of the defense mechanism), but also to boost the relia-
bility of the model prediction in presence of adaptive white-box
attacks. Table 1 compares the success rate of the adaptive white-
box Carlini&WagnerL2 attack [11] against MRR methodology with
the prior-art countermeasures on MNIST benchmark.1 We define
the False Positive (FP) rate as the ratio of legitimate test samples
that are mistaken for adversarial samples by DeepFense. The True
Positive (TP) rate is defined as the ratio of adversarial samples de-
tected by DeepFense. As shown, increasing the number of MRR
modules not only decreases the attack success rate but also yields
a higher perturbation in the generated adversarial samples. The
superior performance of DeepFense is associated with learning the
distribution of legitimate samples as opposed to prior works which
target altering the decision boundaries.
3.2 Latent Defenders
Each latent defender module placed at the nth layer of the victim
model is a neural network architecturally identical to the victim.
This homogeneity of topology enables the defenders to suitably
address the vulnerabilities of the victim network. We consider a
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as the prior probability to char-
acterize the data distribution at each checkpoint location. We em-
phasize that our proposed approach is rather generic and is not
restricted to the GMM. The GMM distribution can be replaced with
any other prior depending on the application.
1We used the open-source library https://github.com/carlini/MagNet to implement
the Carlini&WagnerL2 adaptive attack.
Training a single latent defender. To effectively character-
ize the explored sub-space as a GMM distribution, one is required
to minimize the entanglement between every two Gaussian dis-
tributions (corresponding to every two different classes) while de-
creasing the inner-class diversity. There are three main steps that
shall be performed to train one latent defender module.
Step 1. Replicating the victim neural network and all its param-
eters. An L2 normalization layer is inserted in the desired check-
point location. The normalization layer maps the latent features
(activations), f (x), into the Euclidean space such that the acquired
activation maps are bounded to a hyper-sphere, i.e., ∥ f (x)∥2 = 1.
This normalization is crucial as it partially removes the effect of
over-fitting to particular data samples that are highly correlated
with the underlying DL parameters.
Step 2. Fine-tuning the replicated neural network to enforce disen-
tanglement of data features (at a particular checkpoint location) and
characterize the PDF of explored sub-spaces. To do so, we optimize
the defender module by adding the following loss function to the
conventional cross entropy loss:
γ [ ∥Cy∗ − f (x)∥22︸            ︷︷            ︸
loss1
− Σi,y∗ ∥Ci − f (x)∥22︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
loss2
+ Σi (∥Ci ∥2 − 1)2︸            ︷︷            ︸
loss3
]. (1)
Here, γ is a trade-off parameter that specifies the contribution of
the additive loss term, f (x) is the corresponding feature vector
of input sample x at the checkpoint location, y∗ is the ground-
truth label, and Ci denotes the center corresponding to class i . The
center valuesCi and intermediate feature vectors f (x) are trainable
variables that are learned by fine-tuning the defender module. In
our experiments, we set the parameter γ to 0.01 and retrain the
defender with the same optimizer used for training the victim DNN.
The learning rate is set to 0.1 of that of the victim model as the
model is already in a relatively good local minimum.
The first term (loss1) in Eq. (1) aims to condense latent data
features f (x) that belong to the same class. Reducing the inner-
class diversity, in turn, yields a sharper Gaussian distribution per
class. The second term (loss2) intends to increase the intra-class
distance between different categories and promote separability. If
the loss function consists solely of the first two terms in Eq. (1), the
pertinent model may diverge by pushing the centers to Ci 7→ ±∞.
We add the term, loss3, to ensure that the pertinent centers lie on a
unit hyper-sphere and avoid divergence.
Step 3.After applying Step 2, the latent data features are mapped to
discrete GMMs. Each GMM is defined by the first order (mean) and
second order statistics (covariance) of the legitimate activations. Us-
ing the obtained distributions, DeepFense profiles the percentage of
benign samples lying within different L2 radius of each GMM center.
We leverage a security parameter in the range of [0− 100] to divide
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the underlying space into the sub-space where the legitimate data
lives and its complementary adversarial sub-space. The acquired
percentile profiling is employed to translate the user-defined SP
into an L2 threshold which is later used to detect malicious samples
during the online execution phase.
Figure 2: Example feature samples in the second-to-last
layer of LeNet3 model trained for classifying MNIST data
before (left figure) and after (right figure) data realignment
performed in Step 2. The majority of adversarial samples
(the red dot points) reside in the low density regions.
Figure 2 illustrates the activation maps in the second-to-last
layer of a LeNet3 network trained for classifying MNIST data before
and after data realignment. As shown, the majority of adversarial
samples reside in the rarely-explored regions that can be effectively
detected by our latent defenders.
Trainingmultiple negatively correlated defenders. The
reliability of MRR defense can be increased by training multiple
defenders per layer that are negatively correlated, as opposed to
using only one latent defender. Consider a defender module that
maps a legitimate input x to the feature vector f (x), where f (x) is
close (in terms of Euclidean distance) to the corresponding center
Ci . An adversary trying to mislead this defender would generate a
perturbed input x + η such that f (x + η) is far from Ci and close
to another target center C j . In other words, the adversary would
like to increase the loss1 term in Eq. (1). To mitigate such adaptive
attacks, we propose to train a Markov chain of defenders.
To build the corresponding Markov chain of latent defenders, we
start off by training a single defender module as described earlier
in this section. Next, we generate a new set of training data that
can enforce negative correlations between the current defender
module and the next defender. In particular, the nth defender of this
chain takes an input data x , generates a perturbation η, and feeds
clip(x+η) to the (n+1)th defender. The clip(·) operation simply clips
the input sample in a valid range of numerical values, e.g., between
0 and 1. The perturbation η is chosen as η = ∂loss1∂x , where the loss1
term (See Eq. (1)) corresponds to the nth defender. Given this new
dataset of perturbed samples, benign data points that deviate from
the centers in the nth defender will be close to the corresponding
center in the (n + 1)th defender. As such, simultaneously deceiving
all the defenders requires a higher amount of perturbation.
3.3 Input Defender
One may speculate that an adversary can add a structured noise
to a legitimate sample such that the data point is moved from one
cluster to the center of the other clusters; thus fooling the latent
defender modules. The risk of such an attack approach is signifi-
cantly reduced by leveraging sparse signal recovery techniques. We
use dictionary learning to measure the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(PSNR) of each incoming data and filter out atypical samples in the
input space. An input checkpoint is configured in two main steps.
Step 1.We learn a separate dictionary for each class by solving:
arдmin
Di
1
2 ∥Z
i − DiV i ∥22 + β ∥V i ∥1 s .t . ∥Dik ∥ = 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ kmax . (2)
Here, Z i is a matrix whose columns are pixels extracted from differ-
ent regions of input images belonging to category i . For instance, if
we consider 8 × 8 patches of pixels, each column of Z i would be
a vector of 64 elements. The goal of dictionary learning is to find
matrixDi that best represents the distribution of pixel patches from
images belonging to class i . We denote the number of columns in
Di by kmax . For a certain Di , the image patches Z i are represented
with a sparse matrix V i , and DiV i is the reconstructed sample. We
leverage Least Angle Regression (LAR) to solve Eq. (2).
During the execution phase, the input defender module takes
the output of the victim DNN (e.g., predicted class i) and uses
Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) [17] to sparsely reconstruct
the input with the corresponding dictionary Di . The input sample
labeled as class i should be well-reconstructed as DiV ∗ with a high
PSNR value, where V ∗ is the optimal solution obtained by OMP.
Step 2.Weprofile the PSNR percentiles of legitimate sampleswithin
each class and find the corresponding threshold that satisfies the
user-defined security parameter. If an incoming sample has a PSNR
lower than the threshold (i.e., high perturbation after reconstruction
by the corresponding dictionary), it is regarded as malicious data.
Figure 3: Adversarial detection rate of the latent and input
defender modules as a function of the perturbation level.
Figure 3 demonstrates the impact of perturbation level (ϵ) on
the adversarial detection rate for two different security parameters
(cut-off thresholds). In this experiment, we have considered the Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) attack [5] on LeNet3 MNIST benchmark with a
single latent defender inserted at the second-to-last layer. As shown,
the use of input dictionaries facilitates detection of adversarial
samples with relatively high perturbations.
3.4 Model Fusion
Each defender module in DeepFense framework takes as input a
sample x and generates a binary output dn ∈ {0, 1} with value 1
denoting an adversarial sample. This binary decision is based on the
user-defined security parameter. To aggregate the binary random
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variables {d1, . . . ,dN } into a single decision a, we compute the
probability of the input being adversarial as the following:
P(a = 1|{d1,d2, . . . ,dN }) = 1 −
N∏
n=1
(1 − Pn )dn ,
Pn = P(a = 1|dn = 1).
(3)
This formulation resembles the well-known noisy-OR terminology
used in statistical learning [18]. InMRRmethodology, each defender
has a parameter Pn which indicates the likelihood of a sample being
adversarial given that the nth defender has labeled it as a malicious
sample. If all detectors have Pn = 1, then the formulation in Eq. (3)
is equivalent to the logical OR between {d1, . . . ,dN }.
The Pn parameters can be estimated by evaluating the perfor-
mance of each individual defender. For this purpose, we use a subset
of the training data and create adversarial samples with different
attack algorithms. If the defender suspectsMFalse samples of the
legitimate training data andMT rue samples of the adversarial data
set, the probability P(a = 1|dn = 1) is estimated as:
Pn =
MT rue
MFalse +MT rue
. (4)
The output of the noisy-OR model is in the unit interval. DeepFense
raises alarm flags for samples with P(a = 1|{d1,d2, . . . ,dn }) ≥ 0.5.
4 DeepFense HARDWARE ACCELERATION
In this section, we first discuss the hardware architecture of latent
and input defenders that enables a high throughput and low en-
ergy realization of recurrent execution phase. We, then, discuss the
resource profiling and automated design customization unit.
4.1 Latent Defenders
During execution, each incoming sample is passed through the
latent defender modules that are trained offline (Section 3.2). The
legitimacy probability of each sample is then approximated by
measuring the L2 distance with the corresponding GMM center. The
latent defenders can be situated in any layer of the victim network,
therefore, the extracted feature vector from the DNN can be of high
cardinality. High dimensionality of the GMM centers may cause
shortage of memory as well as increasing the computational cost
and system latency. In order to mitigate the curse of dimensionality,
we perform Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the outputs
of the latent defenders before measuring the L2 distance. For the
latent defenders in the DeepFense framework, PCA is performed
such that more than 99% of the energy is preserved.
Themost computationally-intensive operation in DNN execution
is matrix-matrix multiplication. Recent FPGAs provide hardened
DSP units together with the re-configurable logic to offer a high
computation capacity. The basic function of a DSP unit is a multi-
plication and accumulation (MAC). In order to optimize the design
and make use of the efficient DSP slices, we took a parallelized
approach to convert the DNN layer computations into multiple
operations running simultaneously as suggested in [14]. Figure 4
illustrates the high-level schematic of a latent defender kernel.
Two levels of parallelism are applied in the implementation of the
DNN layers, controlled by parameters NPE and NPU which denote
the parallelism level in the input processing and output genera-
tion stage, respectively. The aforementioned parameters are static
Figure 4: Latent defender structure: The pertinent activations are
acquired by propagating the input sample through the defender.
PCA is then applied to reduce the dimensionality of the obtained
activation. The L2 distance with the corresponding GMM center de-
termines the legitimacy of the input.
across all layers of the DNN model. In order to achieve maximum
throughput, it is essential to fine-tune the parallelism parameters.
An increase in the number of parallel computation units will not
always result in better throughput since the dimensionality of the
data and divisibility into ready-to-process batches highly affects
the efficiency of these parallel units. Section 4.3 provides the details
of our optimization method for such parameters.
To minimize the latency of latent defenders, we infuse the PCA
kernel into the defender DNNs. Collectively, all transformations
from the original input space to the space spanned by principal com-
ponents can be shown as a vector-matrix multiplication T = XWL
whereWL is a matrix whose columns are Eigenvectors obtained
from the legitimate data. The transformationT = XWL maps a data
vector X from an original space of p variables to a new space of L
uncorrelated variables. As such, the PCA kernel can be replaced
with a Dense layer, appended to the defender DNN architecture.
4.2 Input Defenders
Execution of the OMP algorithm is the main computational bot-
tleneck in the input defender modules. The OMP routine requires
iterative processing of threemain steps: (i) finding the bestmatching
sample in the dictionary matrix D, (ii) Least-Square (LS) optimiza-
tion, and (iii) residual update. We provide a scalable implementation
of the OMP routine on FPGA to enable low-energy and in-time anal-
ysis of input data. Figure 5 illustrates the high-level schematic of
an input defender’s kernel. Here, the support set contains columns
of the dictionary matrix that have been chosen so far in the routine.
The LS optimization step is performed using Gram-Schmidt orthog-
onalization technique as suggested in [19] to reduce the hardware
implementation complexity. Note that since the decision of the
defender solely depends on the norm of the residual vector, | |res | |2,
there is no need to explicitly compute the sparse vector V .
The execution of OMP includes two computationally expensive
steps, namely the matrix-vector multiplication and the LS optimiza-
tion. Each of these steps includesmultiple dot product computations.
Due to the sequential nature of dot operations, use of pipelining
does not improve the throughput. Thereby, we use a tree-based
reduction technique to find the final value by adding up the partial
results produced by each of the parallel processes. We pipeline and
unroll the tree-based reduction function to provide a more efficient
solution. Cyclic array partitioning along with loop unrolling is
leveraged to ensure maximum throughput and performance.
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Figure 5: Input defender structure: The OMP core iteratively recon-
structs the input vector bymeans of a previously learned dictionary.
The reconstruction error is used to determine the input legitimacy.
4.3 Automated Design Customization
We provide an automated customization unit that maximizes the
robustness of a DNN within the limits of the pertinent resource
provisioning. Our automated optimization ensures ease of use and
reduces the non-recurring engineering cost. DeepFense’s customiza-
tion unit takes as input the high-level description of the defenders
in Caffe together with the available resources in terms of storage,
DSP units, and run-time. It then outputs the best combination of de-
fender modules to ensure maximum robustness against adversarial
attacks while adhering to the available resources. We thoroughly
examined the performance and resource utilization for different
building blocks of a DNN. These blocks include the essential hyper-
parameters for instantiating the desired DLmodel, including but not
limited to the number of layers and the corresponding input/output
sizes. This enables DeepFense to estimate the upper bound for
implementation of a DNN on resource-constrained platforms.
Dictionary matrices leveraged in the input defender as well as
the weights and biases of the latent defenders are stored in the
on-chip DRAM memory to be accessed during the execution phase.
Upon computation, data is moved from the DRAM to Block RAMs
(BRAM) which enable faster computations. Our evaluations on
various FPGAs show that the main resource bottlenecks are the
BRAM capacity and the number of DSP units. As such, DeepFense
optimizes the configuration of the defenders with regard to these
two constraints. In particular, DeepFense solves the following opti-
mization to find the best configuration for the number of defenders
Ndef and the number of processing units NPU per defender.
Maximize
NPU ,Ndef
(DLrobustness ) s .t . :
Tmaxdef ≤ Tu , Ndef × NPU × DSPPU ≤ Ru ,
NPU × [max(size(W i )) +max(|X i | + |X i+1 |)] ≤ Mu ,
(5)
where Tu , Mu , and Ru are user-defined constraints for system la-
tency, BRAM budget, and available DSP resources, respectively.
Here, size(W i ) denotes the total number of parameters and |X i | is
the cardinality of the input activation in layer i . DSPPU indicates
the number of DSP slices used in one processing unit. Variable
Tmaxdef is the maximum required latency for executing the defender
modules. DeepFense considers both sequential and parallel execu-
tion of defenders based on the available resource provisioning and
size of the victim DNN. Once the optimization is solved for NPU ,
NPE is uniquely determined based on available resources.
The OMP unit in DeepFense incurs a fixed memory footprint and
latency for a given application. As such, the optimization of Eq. (5)
does not include this constant overhead. Instead, we exclude this
overhead from the user-defined constraints and use the updated
upper bounds. In particular, for an OMP kernel, the required com-
putation time can be estimated as βn(kl +k2) where n indicates the
number of elements in the input vector, l is the dictionary size, and
k represents the sparsity level. β is system-dependant and denotes
the number of cycles for one floating point operation. The memory
footprint for OMP kernel is merely a function of the dictionary size.
Our customization unit is designed such that it maximizes the
resource utilization to ensure maximum throughput. DeepFense
performs an exhaustive search over the parameter NPU and solves
the equations in 5 using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) method to
calculateNdef . The calculated parameters capture the best trade-off
between security robustness and throughput. Our optimization out-
puts the most efficient layout of defender modules as well as the se-
quential or parallel realization of defenders. This constraint-driven
optimization is non-recurring and incurs a negligible overhead.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate DeepFense on three different DNN architectures out-
lined in Table 2. Each DNN corresponds to one dataset: MNIST,
SVHN, and CIFAR-10. We report the robustness of the aforemen-
tioned models against four different attacks. The customized de-
fense layout for each network is implemented on two FPGA plat-
forms. A detailed analysis is provided to compare our FPGA imple-
mentation with highly-optimized realizations on CPUs and GPUs.
Table 2: Victim DNN architectures. Here, 20C5 denotes a
convolutional layer with 20 output channels and 5 × 5 fil-
ters, MP2 indicates a 2 × 2 max-pooling, 500FC is a fully-
connected layer with 500 neurons, andGAP is global average
pooling. All hidden layers have a “Relu” activation function.
Benchmark Architecture
MNIST (input) 1 × 28 × 28 − 20C5 −MP2 − 50C5 −MP2−500FC − 10FC
SVHN (input) 3 × 32 × 32 − 20C5 −MP2 − 50C5 −MP2−1000FC − 500FC − 10FC
CIFAR-10
(input) 3 × 32 × 32 − 96C3 − 96C3 − 96C3 −MP2
−192C3 − 192C3 − 192C3 −MP2 − 192C3 − 192C1
−10C1 −GAP − 10FC
5.1 Attack Analysis and Resiliency
We leverage a wide range of attack methodologies (namely, FGS [5],
BIM [6], CarliniL2 [4], and Deepfool [7]) with varying parameters
to ensure DeepFense’s generalizability. The perturbation levels are
selected such that the adversarial noise is undetectable by a human
observer (Table 3 summarizes the pertinent attack parameters).
There is a trade-off between the false positive and the true posi-
tive detection rates that can be controlled using the security param-
eter (see Section 3). The Area Under Curve (AUC) for a TP versus
FP plot is a measure of accuracy for adversarial detection. A ran-
dom decision has an AUC score of 0.5 while an ideal detector will
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Figure 6: AUC score versus the number of defender modules for MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR-10 datasets.
have an AUC score of 1. Figure 6 shows the AUC score obtained by
DeepFense for different attack configurations where the adversary
knows everything about the model but is not aware of the defend-
ers. For a given number of defenders, the AUC score for MNIST
is relatively higher compared to more complex benchmarks (e.g.,
CIFAR-10). This is consistent with our hypothesis since the unex-
plored sub-space is larger in higher-dimensional benchmarks. Note
that using more defenders eventually increases the AUC score.
Table 3: Attack parameters: For CarliniL2 attack [4], “C” de-
notes the confidence, “LR” is the learning rate, “steps” is
the number of binary search steps, and “iterations” stands
for the maximum number of iterations. Superscripts (m →
MNIST, s → SVHN, c → CIFAR-10, a → all) are used to indi-
cate the benchmarks for which the parameters are used.
Attack Attack Parameters
FGS ϵ ∈ {0.01a , 0.05a , 0.1m,c , 0.2m }
Deepfool niter s ∈ {2a , 5a , 10a , 20a , 50a , 100a }
BIM ϵ ∈ {0.001a , 0.002a },niter s ∈ {5a , 10a , 20a , 50m , 100m }
CarliniL2 C ∈ {0
a , 10a , 20s,c , 30s,c , 40s,c , 50c , 60c , 70c }
LR = 0.1a , steps = 10a , iterations = 500a
5.2 Performance Analysis
We implement the customized defender modules on Xilinx Zynq-
ZC702 and Xilinx UltraScale-VCU108 FPGA platforms. All modules
are synthesized using Xilinx Vivado v2017.2. We integrate the syn-
thesized modules into a system-level block diagram with required
peripherals, such as the DRAM, using Vivado IP Integrator. The
frequency is set to 150 MHz and power consumption is estimated
using the synthesis tool. For comparison purposes, we evaluate
DeepFense performance against a highly-optimized TensorFlow-
based implementation on two low-power embedded boards: (i) The
Jetson TK1 development kit which contains an NVIDIA Kepler GPU
with 192 CUDA Cores as well as an ARM Cortex-A15 4-core CPU.
(ii) A more powerful Jetson TX2 board which is equipped with an
NVIDIA Pascal GPU with 256 cores and a 6-core ARM v8 CPU.
Robustness and throughput trade-off. Increasing the number
of checkpoints improves the reliability of model prediction in pres-
ence of adversarial attacks (Section 5.1) at the cost of reducing
the effective throughput of the system. In applications with severe
resource constraints, it is crucial to optimize system performance
to ensure maximum immunity while adhering to the user-defined
timing constraints. In scenarios with more flexible timing budget,
the customization tool automatically allocates more instances of the
defender modules while under strict timing constraints, the robust-
ness is decreased in favor of the throughput. Figure 7 demonstrates
the throughput versus the number of defender modules for MNIST
benchmark on Zynq FPGA. The defender modules are located at
the second-to-last layer of the victim DNN. Here the PCA kernel in
the defender modules reduces the dimensionality to 10.
Figure 7: Throughput of DeepFense with samples from
the MNIST dataset, implemented on the Xilinx Zync-ZC702
FPGA versus the number of instantiated defenders.
Consider the SVHN benchmark, with the same throughput of
1400 samples per second, DeepFense implementation on UltraScale
FPGA can run 8 defenders in parallel while the ARM v8 CPU can
maintain the same throughput with only one defender. This directly
translates to an improvement in the AUC score from 0.76 to 0.96.
Throughput and energy analysis. To corroborate the efficiency
of DeepFense framework, we also evaluate MRR performance on
Jetson TK1 and Jetson TX2 boards operating in CPU-GPU and CPU-
only modes. We define the performance-per-Watt measure as the
throughput over the total power consumed by the system. This met-
ric is an effective representation of the system performance since it
integrates two influential factors for embedded system applications,
namely the throughput and the power consumption. All evaluations
in this section are performed with only one instance of the input
and latent defenders. Figure 8 (left) illustrates the performance-per-
Watt for different hardware platforms. Numbers are normalized by
the performance-per-Watt for the Jetson TK1 platform. As shown,
DeepFense implementation on Zynq shows an average of 38× im-
provement over the Jetson TK1 and 6.2× improvement over the
Jetson TX2 in the CPU mode. The more expensive UltraScale FPGA
performs relatively better with an average improvement of 193×
and 31.7× over the Jetson TK1 and Jetson TX2 boards, respectively.
The comparisons with GPU platforms are delineated in Fig-
ure 8 (right). All values are normalized against the Jetson TK1
performance-per-Watt in the CPU-GPU mode. The evaluations
show an average of 9× and 45.7× improvement over Jetson TK1 by
the Zynq and UltraScale FPGAs, respectively. Comparisons with the
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Figure 8: Performance-per-Watt comparisonwith embedded
CPU (left) and CPU-GPU (right) platforms. Reported values
are normalized by the performance-per-Watt of Jetson TK1.
Jetson TX2 demonstrate 2.74× and 41.5× improvement for the Zynq
and UltraScale implementations. Note that the UltraScale performs
noticeably better than the Zynq FPGA which emphasizes the effect
of resource constraints on parallelism and the throughput.
6 RELATEDWORK
In response to the various adversarial attack methodologies pro-
posed in the literature (e.g., [4, 5, 7]), several research attempts
have been made to design DL strategies that are more robust in
the face of adversarial examples. The existing countermeasures can
be classified into two categories: (i) Supervised strategies which
leverage the noise-corrupted inputs [20] and/or adversarial exam-
ples [5, 21, 22] during training of a DL model. These countermea-
sures are particularly tailored for specific perturbation patterns and
can only partially evade adversarial samples generated by other
attack scenarios (with different perturbation distributions) from be-
ing effective as shown in [20]. (ii) Unsupervised approaches which
aim to address adversarial attacks by smoothing out the gradient
space (decision boundaries) [4, 23] or compressing the DL model
by removing the nuisance variables [24]. These set of works have
been mainly remained oblivious to the data density in the latent
space and are shown to be vulnerable to adaptive attacks where the
adversary knows the defense mechanism [25]. More recently, [8]
proposes an unsupervised manifold projection method called Mag-
Net to reform adversarial samples using auto-encoders. As shown
in [11], manifold projection methods including MagNet are not
robust to adversarial samples and can approximately increase the
required distortion to generate adversarial sample by only 30%.
DeepFense methodology (called MRR) is an unsupervised ap-
proach that significantly improves the robustness of DL models
against best-known adversarial attacks to date. Unlike DeepFense,
no prior work has addressed resource efficiency or online perfor-
mance of their defense algorithm.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presents DeepFense, a novel end-to-end framework for
online accelerated defense against adversarial samples in the con-
text of deep learning. We introduce modular robust redundancy as a
viable unsupervised countermeasure to significantly reduce the risk
of integrity attacks. To ensure applicability to various deep learning
tasks and FPGA platforms, DeepFense provides an API that takes as
input the high-level description of a deep neural network together
with the specifications of the underlying hardware platform. Using
a software-hardware-algorithm co-design approach, our automated
customization tool optimizes the defense layout to maximize model
reliability (safety) while complying with the hardware and/or user
constraints. Our extensive evaluations corroborate the effectiveness
and practicality of DeepFense framework.
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